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REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

Critique of Some Recent Subjunctive Theories, by CHARLES EDWIN BENNETT. (Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, IX, 1898.)

In No. IX of the Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, Bennett subjects my theories regarding certain uses of the Latin subjunctive to much illuminating criticism, and points out a few inaccuracies of which I have been guilty in matters of detail. I never find any great satisfaction in discussing syntactical questions which there is reason to believe can never be definitely settled; and, at first sight, it would now seem that we here have to do with just such questions. The personal equation seems sometimes to cause no end of trouble even in the field of syntax. Delbrück, for instance, regards my theory that questions of obligation or propriety like *cur non laeter?* developed from the Indo-European optative, as established beyond all possible doubt (Vergleichende Syntax, II, p. 389)¹; Bennett regards this theory as without the slightest foundation to rest upon (Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, No. IX, pp. 1-30). Again, Geddes (Classical Review for Oct. 1898, p. 355 ff.), after an independent investigation of the entire field covered by my discussion of the Latin prohibitive, and after extending this investigation also through the period of Silver Latin (a period not covered by my own investigation), says that his results for all periods are "largely confirmatory" of my own conclusions.² Bennett, on the other hand (pp. 48 ff.), after a careful examination of Plautus, regards these conclusions as quite groundless. When authorities reach conclusions so diametrically opposed to each other, after a study of exactly the same material, it might well seem useless to hope that, without new material to work with, conclusions could be reached that would be generally accepted. I venture to believe, however, that some of the more important differences between Bennett's views and my own are more apparent than real. This is certainly true as far as my theory regarding the force of tenses in the prohibitive is concerned, and the primary purpose of the present article is to make my position

¹ This view has also been adopted in the new edition of Harkness' Latin Grammar (§557).

² Since the above was written, Professor Clement, who has made a careful examination of my theory as applied to Silver Latin, has published (Proceedings of the Am. Phil. Ass. XXX, p. xxxvi) statistics showing that my claim regarding the energetic force of *ne* with the perfect subjunctive in earlier times holds good for that period also.

on this point clearer than I seem to have done in my original discussion. There are, to be sure, here and there a few real differences between Bennett and myself in our interpretations of certain passages. For instance, in Merc. 113 Bennett regards *caue praeuorteris* as "merely a mild self-exhortation," instead of an emotional prohibition, as I claimed it was. I am at a loss to know how Bennett can justify his interpretation. At the moment of uttering this prohibition, the speaker, intensely excited, is in such headlong haste to get to his master that he is gasping for breath (114), has burst his lungs, as he claims, and is spitting blood (138), threatens to knock over every one that gets in his way (115-116) and fight him (119), if need be. Finding that his knees are failing him, he cries out "perii! perii!" (124-125). A moment later (130) he threatens to knock the door into splinters. Furthermore, the act involved in the prohibition *caue praeuorteris* is the very act through fear of which he is so greatly agitated. Is one to look for "mild self-exhortation" under such circumstances as these? In several other passages Bennett's interpretation seems to me equally improbable (see below). But, apart from a few details of this nature, the seeming differences between us, so far as I can see, are due to the fact that Bennett has misunderstood what my theory really is. He seems to think that I claim that, whenever a person is aroused from any cause whatever, he uses the perfect in making a prohibition, quite regardless of the character of the act itself that is involved in the prohibition. I make no such claim as that. The emotion, or earnestness, which I claim lies in the prohibition comes from alarm, indignation, or the like, caused by a fear (real or pretended) that the act prohibited will take place. If this act itself is of such a character that no particular harm would be likely to result from its performance, I should not expect the perfect to be used (however much excited the speaker might be from other causes), except in those rare instances where energetic utterance is purposely affected for some reason. To illustrate: if, in reply to a threat of punishment, some one excitedly says '*Don't* strike me!' I should expect the perfect tense. In fact, one would have to search a long time for an instance of the present tense used in such an answer (see comments on Epid. 595, below) to such a threat. On the other hand, just such cases are not uncommon among the instances of the perfect tense. In every such case, if the prohibition is not complied with, the speaker will be made aware of the fact by some disastrous result. To show the contrast between such a prohibition as this and one in which an excited speaker uses the present tense, let us take the passage found in Rud. 968 *hunc homo feret a me nemo: ne tu te speres potis*, a passage cited against me by Bennett. I quite agree with Bennett that the speaker here is excited; but I do not see any reason for uttering *ne speres* with greater emphasis, or energy, than any other unemphatic word, or phrase, in the sentence, e. g. than *feret* or *potis*. Indeed, all of

the emphasis is upon *tu* and *te*. This would be made flat and ridiculous by translating 'For God's sake *don't* you hope (or, don't you *hope*) that you can!' It means merely 'Don't *you* hope that *you* can!', with no emphasis whatever upon the *speres*. Whether the act of hoping takes place or not, is in reality a matter of no particular concern to the speaker. Indeed, the interests of the speaker are so little involved in the act of hoping that he will never even so much as know whether the prohibition is complied with or not, unless some one takes pains to tell him. The present tense is exactly what my theory demands here. *Ne speraueris* is probably unknown to the Latin language,¹ and in my Latin Prohibitive I lay the utmost stress upon the rarity of the perfect tense with verbs of this class. Indeed, the scarcity of the perfect and the frequency of the present with such verbs form one of the main grounds for my theory. I can imagine a situation under which I should expect even such a prohibition as 'Do not think!' to take the perfect tense. If, for instance, a girl were inclined to think her betrothed guilty of some disgraceful deed and threatened to dismiss him as a result of this suspicion, and if he were passionately pleading with her to believe him innocent, I should expect him to use the perfect tense in saying '*Do* not think me guilty!'; for her thinking so would mean the ruin of his happiness. Wherever the failure to heed a prohibition *even of a purely mental act* would be fraught with serious consequences either to the speaker or to some other person in whom the speaker takes a deep interest, my theory would lead one to expect the perfect tense. But it happens that no such condition of things is found among the instances of *ne* with verbs of mental activity, except *irata ne sies* in Am. 924 (see further comments upon this passage below).

I find that more than one reader of my original discussion have understood my position to be substantially that which Bennett has attributed to me. I am, however, considerably consoled by the fact that most of my reviewers have not misunderstood me. In re-reading my discussion, I still fail to see how any one can get the impression that my theory concerns *merely* the mood of the speaker without any reference to the character of the act prohibited, to the speaker's attitude toward that particular act, and to the results that will follow a failure to comply with the prohibition. I can, to be sure, detect a lack of clearness in two or three sentences I use referring to the context in which prohibitions stand, but in laying down the fundamental principles with which

¹ In Luc. Phars. 8, 451 both the MSS and editors are divided between *nec speraueris* and *ne speraueris*. In view of the usage elsewhere, there can, I think, be little doubt that *nec* is here the correct reading. Still, I can not vouch for the entire absence of such uses as *ne speraueris* from the period of decline. Professor Clement has kindly called my attention to *ne inuideris* (Val. Flac. 5, 507 and Plin. Ep. 6, 17, 4), *ne expectaueris* (? Curt. Ruf. 4, 10, 32), and *ne credideris* (Curt. Ruf. 7, 8, 29).

I start as the sole foundation of my whole theory and upon which alone that theory depends, I am so explicit that I might fairly expect everything that follows to be interpreted in the light of those fundamental principles. When I appeal to the context, it is only for the purpose of getting side-light where side-light is needed for the clearer understanding of the speaker's attitude toward the act of the prohibition itself. With a prohibition like *ne speres* such a side-light is never (or, at least, seldom) needed; with one like *ne feceris*, such a side-light is *always* needed, since, without the context, one can never know whether the act involved is one of particular importance or not. As the fundamental conception upon which my whole theory rests, I claim (pp. 138-139 [6-7]) that the difference between *ne feceris* and *ne facias* is, that *ne feceris* is used of an act which must be prevented at all hazards; it implies that the speaker can not abide the thought of its happening; while *ne facias* is used when the speaker is taking a comparatively calm, dispassionate view of the prohibited act. Regarding this distinction my words are as follows (p. 139 [7]): "*I wish to insist upon this (feature of the perfect tense) as the only real distinction between the two tenses with ne.*" After elaborating this idea, that the choice of tense depends upon the character of the act as viewed by the speaker, I account for the predominance, in the present tense, of verbs indicating mental activity, in the following language: (p. 146 [14]): "If my distinction between the two tenses is correct, we should expect that a prohibition dealing with mere mental action, e. g. 'Do not suppose,' 'Do not be surprised,' 'Do not be afraid,' *would commonly take the present tense, because, . . . as far as the interests of the speaker are concerned, it matters little whether the prohibition be complied with or not.*" As the acts involved in such prohibitions are in their very nature of such a character that the thought of their occurrence would not ordinarily alarm the speaker, or arouse him to vigorous utterance, I claimed them forthwith as supporting my theory. I did not under these circumstances think it worth while to consider whether the speaker in any given case was, or was not, aroused from some cause not connected with the prohibition, for the reason that the question whether he was, or not, did not have the slightest essential bearing upon the application of my theory to the prohibition of acts of this character. Though the points above indicated are the essential points in my theory—constitute, in fact, all there is in the theory—Bennett seems oftentimes to have left them wholly out of consideration, and to have classified his instances merely according to the presence, or absence, of "special excitement" on the part of the speaker, without any regard whatever to the importance of the act prohibited. I may note, in passing, that Bennett makes too much out of the word 'excitement.' A desire for mere energetic utterance, without excitement, plays quite as important a part in my theory as does excitement. How, for instance, can any one get the impres-

sion from what I say on p. 139 (7) that I consider Cato 'excited' when he uses the perfect tense? The only explanation of these uses suggested by me is the importance, to Cato's mind, of the particular act prohibited, and a consequent desire to lay stress upon it. Furthermore, Bennett argues without any reference to the inherent probability of the existence of some distinction between the two tenses. Even Delbrück, with his own theory, admits (Vergl. Synt. II, p. 383) that the distinction I draw would be a natural one to expect incidentally. The proper attitude, it seems to me, would be to assume some distinction wherever we possibly can and reject it only when we are absolutely obliged to. If any one sets out to claim that there is no distinction between two different tenses, the burden of proof is certainly wholly upon him.

I trust that I have now succeeded in making clear what I consider to be essential in my theory of the distinction between the two tenses. As a fair test of the correctness of the theory, let all these prohibitions be divided into two classes—(1) those in which non-compliance will be disastrous or shocking, and which would therefore naturally be uttered with unusual energy, or earnestness; and (2) those of such a sort that it is a matter of no particular consequence to one's interests whether they be heeded or not, or of such a sort that no particular alarm is felt through fear that the prohibited act will be performed. When the particular act that is prohibited is of such a character that it falls *clearly* under one of these two classes, it is not necessary to take into consideration the context in which the prohibition stands. If a speaker were to adopt an emotional tone in prohibiting a commonplace act, he would make himself ridiculous, and arouse laughter instead of sympathy. However, in classifying according to the nature of the act prohibited and the speaker's attitude toward that act, there is room for errors. Even when a person is prohibiting an act which, if performed, would bring disaster, he may for some reason purposely soften his tone and use the less energetic form of prohibition; on the other hand, when he is prohibiting an indifferent, or a commonplace, act, he may as a bit of pleasantry, or from some other motive, adopt an emotional, energetic tone. This last might be expected to be especially common in comedy and other colloquial styles. But, on the whole, the general results of such a classification as I have indicated may be regarded as trustworthy.

If all the instances be divided into the two classes just indicated, it will be found that the instances of the present tense, with extremely rare exceptions, fall into one class, while those of the perfect tense, with few exceptions (comparatively), fall into the other class. In making this classification I am quite ready, for the sake of the argument, to exclude all those instances of the present tense which Bennett regards as subordinate, though many, if not most of them, are commonly regarded as genuine prohibitions. We must now further omit *ne attigas* from the list of

presents as being an aorist (see, for instance, Lindsay, *The Latin Language*, p. 464). Finally, we may omit *ne molestus sis*, which, in most cases, may be regarded as subordinate with as much confidence as many of those clauses which Bennett insists upon so interpreting; in any case, it is merely a stereotyped phrase (originally a mild 'Don't bother,' or 'lest you bother'), in which the tense was no longer specially chosen each time the phrase was used—the tense was inseparable from the phrase. This fact is recognized even by Seyffert (*Bursian's Jahresber. über die Fortschritte der class. Alterthumswissenschaft*, 22, p. 338), whom surely no one will accuse of being unduly partial to my theory.¹ In fact, this is about the only one of my contentions that he seems willing to accept. If this phrase were included, it would not materially affect our conclusions, as it is commonly prompted by trivial circumstances. Most of the remaining instances of the present are on much the same footing as *ne speres* mentioned above. Of all the instances, with one exception, in which the verb is one denoting mental activity (and these form a very large proportion of the entire number), we may simply say that the result of a failure to comply with the prohibition has so little bearing upon the speaker's interests that, as in the case of *ne speres*, he will never so much as know whether his prohibition is complied with or not. These of course may be at once omitted from further consideration. We may also omit from consideration all those instances which Bennett himself classifies as calm, commonplace prohibitions. Confining ourselves to the most emotional instances which Bennett has been able to cite, let us apply our test by asking regarding each, 'What will be the result of non-compliance with the prohibition?'

Capt. 947 *ne duis* ('you needn't give'). The person addressed will pay the speaker money for a slave instead of accepting him as a gift. It would be absurd to translate this 'for Heaven's sake, *don't* give!', as though the prohibition involved anything of importance.

Stich. 320 *ne cures*. The person addressed will try to play the agreeable by asking such innocent questions as 'Where have you been? What have you there?' Here again '*Don't* care!' or '*Don't care!*' would be absurd translations.

¹ Seyffert has understood my theory, but he rejects it for the insufficient reason that he finds a few instances that seem to him out of harmony with it. His proper method would have been to apply the test to all instances. After doing this, it would then have been in order for him to make whatever comments he chose upon any instances that seemed to him exceptions to my rule. Such exceptions could not have been many. I do not appreciate the force of his argument when he cites against me Bacch. 597 *mihi cautios, ne nucifrangibula excussit ex malis meis*. As if the idea 'lest he knock my nutcrackers out of my jaws' did not admit of energetic utterance! Similarly, *metuo ne defuerit oratio* means 'I fear lest words suddenly fail me'; *desit* would mean merely 'be wanting.' Seyffert further is forced to use against me *nil* with the perfect subjunctive, a use with which my theory regarding *ne* has nothing to do.

Ib. 568, 713 *ne me territes*. The person addressed will try to frighten the speaker. Here, as I have pointed out in 'The Latin Prohibitive,' the feeling is not that the failure to comply with *ne territes* will be disastrous to the speaker, but rather that it will do the person addressed no good to try to frighten him. No one would think of translating this '*don't* frighten me!' or '*don't frighten* me!'. It means rather '*don't* frighten *me*!', i. e. '*don't* try to frighten *me* (for you can't do it)'. Clearly, then, this prohibition is not prompted by any fear of the performance of the act indicated by *territes*. Bennett here, as elsewhere, missed my point in commenting on my remarks.

If we were thus to go through the entire list of the most emotional prohibitions cited by Bennett, the result would in nearly every case be the same. The only possible exceptions are Amph. 924, Trin. 267, Capt. 548, Men. 789. But in the first of these *irata sies* may possibly be felt as the perfect of *irascor* (though this perfect is undoubtedly extremely rare). The second might well be taken as subordinate, depending upon *habeto*, in which case there should be only a comma after this word. As regards the third, there is hardly an instance among all those which Bennett insists (pp. 58 ff.) upon taking as subordinate that is more naturally so taken than this very clause; the sense would then be '(I say this) lest,' etc. Similarly, *ne obserues* in Men. 789 may be taken as parallel with *ut geras* and dependent upon *monstrauit*. Among the prohibitions classed by Bennett as not emotional are found two instances of the present, where non-compliance might be regarded as detrimental to the speaker's interests, viz. *ne duas* (Merc. 401) and *caue fidem fluxam geras* (Capt. 439).¹ As regards the present tense, then, our results may be summed up as follows:—Out of some 68 instances there are *only two* sure cases of prohibition where non-compliance would be particularly detrimental or disastrous, *and these two cases Bennett himself regards as calm and commonplace in tone*.

If, now, we apply the same test to the instances of the perfect tense, we get a very different showing. Here non compliance with the prohibition will involve the following consequences:² *death* (or *threats of death*), in Epid. 148, Aul. 744, Merc. 484, Poen. 1023 (cf. 1025 f.), Mil. 1333 (a case of fainting); *loss of valued treasure* or *danger thereof*, in Rud. 1155 (cf. *perii* in same line), Curc. 599

¹*Ne me deseras* in Mil. 1363 can not be included here; see 'The Latin Prohib.' (Am. Journ. Phil. XV 2, p. 145; Reprint, p. 13). Similarly, *caue praeterebitas ullas aedis* (Epid. 437) involves nothing of any importance, though the *caue rettuleris*, in 439, does (see below).

²In examining the passages referred to, one should keep in mind the fact that extravagant or energetic address always invites a reply of a similar tone. One need not therefore be surprised to find threats of murder, suicide, or the like, answered by the use of the perfect tense, even when the threats are not seriously meant.

(the parasite is escaping with the stolen ring), Aul. 100, Aul. 585 (ne immutassis nomen = 'do not play me false.' Bennett says this "entire passage is one of calm confidence." It seems to me rather that Euclio is constantly beside himself for fear that the gold will be lost. He has so little real confidence in Fides, and such fear of her betraying him, that he implores her again and again (with the perfect subjunctive) not to do so; cf. 585, 608 (the first words he utters after 586), 611, 614. Everything depends upon Fides. The *non metuo* in 609 is used not with reference to Fides' betrayal, but with reference to some person's finding the gold without such betrayal, i. e. it contrasts *inueniat* with *indicassis*. Euclio's actions and words betray at every turn serious fear that Fides will betray him. And a little later (624-660) he feels so sure that she *has* betrayed him that he can not be convinced to the contrary till he actually gets hold of his treasure again. It would be difficult to conceive of any one more frantic over anything than Euclio is in 624-660 over the mere suspicion that Fides has played him false. The energetic tense here is exactly what I should expect from such a character as Euclio, whose anxiety about his gold is his ruling passion), Mil. 1245, Bacch. 1188, Aul. 608 (see remarks above on 585), Aul. 618, Vid. 91; *personal violence, flogging*, etc., in Pers. 793 (cf. 780 ff.), Mil. 1125, Cas. 404, Trin. 1012 (The speaker is so wrought up over his danger that he calls upon himself to hurry five times within five lines in order to save his *scapulae* (1009) and escape the ox-whips (1011)), Truc. 943; *betrayal and torture*, in Mil. 862 (cf. 859); *ruin and disaster*, in Trin. 521 (cf. 524, 525, 526), Men. 415, Trin. 555 (If the person addressed *does* tell, the speaker will get a flogging, alluded to in *tu hercle et illi et alibi*, for balking his master's scheme, and both he and his master will be deprived of the only thing upon which their support depends; for, after learning the truth, Philo will take the land. Cf. 595), Bacch. 910 (the speaker's son will continue unrebuked his life of debauchery, which has just involved the latter in trouble, disgrace, and financial loss), Cist. 300; *starvation*, in Trin. 513; *insults to the speaker and his mistress*, in Asin. 625; *balking of carefully laid plans*, in Most. 1097 (a moment later, in 1108, the speaker ejaculates that he is ruined, and he threatens (1114) to set fire to the altar and burn the fellow off. Bennett says that an energetic prohibition would be "certain to defeat the object which he hopes to realize" and that the tone "can only be one of gentle coaxing." But I fail to see why "gentle coaxing" would not be as likely to defeat the speaker's purpose as an energetic protest. Any explanation that would make the former seem natural would make the latter seem equally natural. Furthermore, irascible people are very likely to defeat their own ends at such games by uncontrollable outbursts. The speaker, by the way, explains his earnestness in the next verse, in a way calculated to allay all suspicion), Mil. Gl. 1368 (Energetic utterance would arouse no suspicion,

as the speaker with the next breath attributes his utterance to anxiety for his master's welfare. The conceit of the captain would be sure to take this anxiety as sincere), Mil. 1371 (see remarks on 1368), Most. 401; *pursuit by ghosts*, in Most. 523; *escape of a lunatic*, in Men. 994 (Here *caue flocci fecerit* is not an expression of mere mental activity; it means 'let no threat prevent you from carrying the lunatic to the Doctor'); *danger to the chastity of the speaker's daughter*, in Epid. 400 (cf. 404-405); *disappointment in love*, in Merc. 401, 402, Epid. 439 (the present subjunctive *caue praeterbitas ullas aedis* occurs in 437, but not so much depends upon a compliance with this prohibition; it was not important that he should stop at each house—an absurd performance and one unnecessary to the accomplishment of his purpose; the only thing of importance was *to find where Periphanes lived*, and a failure to comply with *caue rettuleris* would mean a failure to do this); *delay of important information*, in Merc. 113 (see my remarks above on this passage); *imparting of distressing information*, in Vid. 83; *shocked modesty*, in Mil. Gl. 283 (pretended resentment at immodest allusions are extremely common in Plautus); *wounding of loved one's feelings*, in Cist. 110 (depth of feeling moves hearers to tears; cf. 112); *failure to rescue master from a dilemma or mistress from grief*, in Asin. 256 (furthermore, the speaker will get a flogging that has been promised him; cf. 363 and 315), Stich. 285 (Here again *caue flocci feceris* is not an expression of mere mental action, but means 'let no one interfere with you').

The instances just given comprise 43 out of the 58 instances of the perfect to be found in Plautus. We have already found, then, that nearly all of the 68 instances of the present tense fall into one of the two classes into which I have divided prohibitions, while more than 74 per cent. of the instances of the perfect fall into the other class. This condition of things in itself, whatever might be the character of the remaining 15 instances of the perfect, is enough to establish in a general way the distinction I have drawn between the two tenses. But even the remaining 15 instances of the perfect are not necessarily unfavorable to, or even exceptions to, my theory. In fact it will be found that some of them support it in the most decided manner. All that my theory claims is that the perfect tense is the tense of energetic utterance. While such utterance would be commonly confined to the prohibition of an act the result of which, if performed, would be detrimental to one's interests, or shocking to one's feelings, and while such a classification forms perhaps the best general basis for classification, it does not at all follow that prohibitions may not be occasionally uttered with unusual energy, from other causes than from a fear of the results of the act involved. In fact, some of these 15 instances are certainly characterized by energetic utterance (as admitted by Bennett himself). The very large proportion of the instances of the perfect in which that tense clearly indicates

energetic utterance creates an assumption in favor of a similar interpretation of the remaining cases; and the probability of the correctness of this assumption is still further established by the fact that the present tense, as has been shown above, is almost exclusively confined to commonplace prohibitions, in which energetic prohibition of the particular act involved would be without point, and frequently absurd. Let us see, then, how far it seems natural to assume energetic utterance as characteristic of these remaining instances:

Epid. 595 *ubi noles, ne fueris pater*, 'when you don't want to be my father, for Heaven's sake *don't!*' This is the reply of Acropolitis to Periphanes' threat that he will kill her if she ever calls him father again. Energetic threats, whether seriously meant or not, always invite energetic replies. Prohibitions which are thus used in replying to dire threats and in the translation of which one naturally puts the emphasis upon the prohibition itself (e. g. '*Don't* do that!' or '*Don't do* that!') never, I believe, take the present tense, while numerous examples of the perfect tense in such prohibitions have been cited above.

Truc. 606 *istuc ne responsis*. This involves a threat prompted by a defiant reply to the speaker, who is very angry and threatens to cut the former into bits if he adds another word. The words really mean 'Don't you *give* me such an answer as that, or, if you do, take the consequences.' Failure to comply will thus involve disaster to the person addressed. A prohibition which in this way involves a threat of disaster that will befall through failure to comply with it, never takes the present tense, so far as I have noticed; and this again is in strict accord with my theory.

Pers. 572 *ne sis ferro parseris*. If the speaker does not persuade the person addressed to act upon his advice, his deeply laid plot will come to nothing, and heavy loss will result. The *ne . . . parseris* may perhaps be used as an expression calculated to impress the person addressed, a procurer, with the exceptional value of the girl that the speaker wants him to buy. Every line of this speech is extravagant in tone. Excitement is not present, but energetic and extravagant utterance abounds along here at every turn.

Trin. 704 *id me commissurum ut patiar fieri ne animum induxeris*. The words of both Lesbonicus and Lysiteles along here seem to me brimful of emotion. See my comments below on this passage.

Asin. 839 *ne dixis istuc*.—*Ne sic fueris*, 'for Heaven's sake, don't *be* so!'

Epid. 723 *ne attigas*, 'don't *touch* me!' This is the surly reply of Epidicus, who thus shows his resentment at having been unjustly bound.

Pseud. 79 Eheu.—Eheu? idquidem hercle ne parsis, 'for Heaven's sake, *don't* be backward about asking for that!'

Poen. 553 nos tu ne curassis. Not merely in 541, but again in 571, the *advocati* are accused of being exceedingly angry, and both times on account of their spiteful language. Bennett would contend, then, that the *advocati* may fly into an angry passion, and use spiteful language, twice inside of three or four minutes, and that during the other two or three minutes there is "no vestige" of such a mood or tone. The tone of the *advocati* from the beginning of the scene has been for the most part surly.

Ib. 993 ne parseris, 'show him no *mercy*!' i. e. 'get out of him all the particulars.'

Asin. 467 caue supplicassis. Bennett himself regards this as uttered with emotion.

How far the assumption of energetic utterance in these 15 instances seems unnatural or impossible must be left to the judgment of my readers. To me it seems neither unnatural nor impossible. If, however, in any one of these passages such an assumption were to be regarded as impossible, then it might be set down as an exception to the rule, which would, to my mind, in no way destroy the validity of the general distinction I have drawn.

It will be noticed that I have in the above classification concerned myself solely with the instances of *ne* and *caue*. The other instances cited by Bennett are not instances of *ne*, or *caue*, and have been shown to have wholly distinct characteristics.¹ In 'The Latin Prohibitive' I laid the utmost emphasis upon the fact that my theory applied only to prohibitions expressed by *ne* and *caue*, and that instances of the perfect subjunctive with *nec*, *ne . . . quidem*, etc., lay entirely outside of its range of application. Curiously enough, my theory has been taken completely out of my hands, extended so as to cover phenomena to which I said in the most emphatic language it could not possibly apply, and then instances of these latter phenomena have been cited against me as though opposed to my own theory. I am more than ready to admit that most of the instances of *nec*, *ne . . . quidem*, *nihil*, *nullum*, *numquam*, with the perfect subjunctive, are at all periods of the literature dis-

¹ Whatever explanation be adopted for the perfect subjunctive after *nec*, *ne . . . quidem*, *nihil*, *numquam*, etc., it is an indisputable fact that its use with these words differs in a *very marked degree* in almost every respect from its use with *ne*; e. g. (1) with *ne*, it is never used in dignified, deferential address; with the other particles, it is very common in such address; (2) with *ne*, it is seldom used with verbs indicating purely mental action (at least before the end of the Augustan period); with the other particles it is used *chiefly* with just such verbs; (3) with *ne*, it is entirely unknown to many productions in which with the other particles it is common. Even if all the instances with *nec*, *ne . . . quidem*, etc., were to be recognized as true volitives, my theory would still hold good for *ne* as distinguished in use from the other particles.

tinctly opposed to Bennett's extension of my theory. But this does not, so far as I can see, affect the validity of my conclusions regarding the force of *ne* with the subjunctive.

Bennett inadvertently misrepresents me on p. 65, unless he is still to be understood as limiting his remarks to Plautus. I did not say that verbs of mental action are *never* found in prohibitions expressed by *ne* and *caue* with the perfect subjunctive. My words ('The Latin Prohibitive,' pp. 152-153 [20-21]) were: "in the whole history of the Latin language, from the earliest times down to and including Livy, there are to be found in prohibitions expressed by *ne* with the perfect subjunctive only two, or at most three, verbs denoting *mere* mental activity." I did say that no such instances occur in Plautus, and I still believe that to be true. None of the instances cited by Bennett (p. 65) belong to the class of phenomena of which I was speaking. *Induxeris* and *feceris* are not 'verbs' of mental activity, and his other examples are not instances of *ne* or *caue*. *Animus* with *induxeris* forms, to be sure, an *expression* (though not a 'verb') of mental activity, and should have been referred to by me as a kindred phenomenon. The expression *caue flocci feceris* does not refer to the *mere* mental act of *forming a low or high estimate* (see remarks above on these passages), and *flocci facere* is therefore quite different in character from *putare*, *existimare*, *metuere*, *sperare*, etc., etc.

As the use of the perfect subjunctive with *nec* (*neque*), *nihil*, *ne* . . . *quidem*, *numquam*, etc., is not included in my theory regarding its use with *ne*, consideration of Bennett's *critique* of my interpretation of these passages is reserved for another paper.

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The Treatment of Nature in the Poetry of the Roman Republic,
by KATHARINE ALLEN. (Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, Philology and Literature Series, vol. I, pp. 89-219.)

With this dissertation of Miss Allen's and Mr. H. R. Fairclough's suggestive monograph on the attitude of the Greek tragedians towards nature, it would seem as if the claims of the ancients in this particular sphere were in a fair way to being vindicated, and the Philistines who are prone to regard nature as a wholly modern discovery discomfited. While Miss Allen has not so rich a field as her predecessor on the Greek side, and perhaps not so skilful a hand, she has succeeded in getting together a very considerable amount of interesting and valuable material. She gives a detailed treatment of all the poets from Livius Andronicus to Varro Atacinus, with the exception of the writers of comedy. Her method is in the highest degree systematic. In the case of each poet, sky, sea, streams, mountains, etc., are treated in succession,